This chapter presents the text of the Lectures on Ethics, which was compiled by Paul Menzer from manuscript notes of Kant's annual lectures. In the Lectures, Kant formulates a clear conception of the nature of ‘practical philosophy’ as a science which is concerned with the purely rational a priori laws governing the conduct of beings possessed of a free will. In view of what critics have sometimes said about the absence of a concern for personal happiness in Kant's (...) class='Hi'>ethics, one should note his final unequivocal declaration that ‘God's will is that we should make ourselves happy' and that this is the true morality’. A fairly large section of the Lectures on Ethics is devoted to the doctrine of religion, and as well as being independently interesting as an account of Kant's attitude to religion, it helps to make more explicit the general metaphysical background which forms the context for his developing ethical theory. (shrink)

This publication of Dewey’s lectures in courses on "The Psychology of Ethics" and "Political Ethics" at the University of Chicago is a welcome addition to the edition of his Early Works in five volumes, covering the period 1882-98. The text is based on stenographic records, expertly edited, annotated and introduced by Donald F. Koch.

There are three obstacles to any discussion of the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and ethics. First, Heidegger’s views and preoccupations alter considerably over the course of his work. There is no consensus over the exact degree of change or continuity, but it is clear that a number of these shifts, for example over the status of human agency, have considerable ethical implications. Second, Heidegger rarely engages directly with the familiar ethical or moral debates of the philosophical canon. For example, (...) both Sein und Zeit (SZ) and the works that would have completed its missing third Division, works such as his monograph on Kant (Ga3), and the 1927 lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Ga24), place enormous emphasis on the flaws present in earlier metaphysics or philosophies of language or of the self. But there is no discussion of what one might think of as staple ethical questions: for example, the choice between rationalist or empiricist meta-ethics, or between consequentialist or deontological theories. The fundamental reason for this is Heidegger’s belief that his own concerns are explanatorily prior to such debates (Ga26:236–7). By extension, he regards the key works of ethical and moral philosophy as either of secondary importance, or as not really about ethics or morals at all: for example, Ga24, when discussing Kant, states bluntly that “‘Metaphysics of Morals’ means the ontology of human existence” (Ga24:195). Essentially his view is that, before one can address ethics, construed as the question of how we ought to live, one needs to get clear on ontology, on the question of what we are. However, as I will show, the relationship between Heideggerian ontology and ethics is more complex than that simple gloss suggests. Third, the very phrase “Heidegger’s ethics” raises a twofold problem in a way that does not similarly occur with any other figure in this volume. The reason for this is his links, personal and institutional, to both National Socialism and to anti-Semitism. The recent publication of the Schwarze Hefte exemplifies this issue: these notebooks interweave rambling metaphysical ruminations with a clearly anti-Semitic rhetoric no less repulsive for the fact that it avoids the biological racism of the Nazis (see, for example, Ga95:97 or Ga96:243). In this short chapter, I will take what will doubtless be a controversial approach to this third issue. It seems to me unsurprising, although no less disgusting for that, that Heidegger himself was anti-Semitic, or that he shared many of the anti-modernist prejudices often found with such anti-Semitism Sacha Golob ([email protected]) Forthcoming in the Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge University Press: 2016). 2 among his demographic group. The interesting question is rather: what are the connections between his philosophy and such views? To what degree do aspects of his work support them or perhaps, most extremely, even follow from them? Yet to answer this question, one needs to begin by understanding what exactly his philosophical commitments were, specifically his ‘ethical’ commitments. The purpose of this chapter is address that question. (shrink)

HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, CRITICISM. Philosophy has a history because human life is historical. This truism assumes a deeper, more puzzling, and unsettling significance in the programmatic section 6 of Sein und Zeit, which promises nothing less than a Destruktion of the history of philosophy centered on a few pivotal figures and guided by the problem of temporality as the horizon and transcendental condition of any understanding and explicit interpretation of the sense of being. If the Seinsfrage cannot be formulated, let alone (...) answered, without this detour through the history of ontology, it is precisely because the philosophizing human being is its past, because the philosopher's past does not merely trail behind the present as a foregone conclusion but "always already advances ahead of it." Every effort to free ourselves from tradition and to begin with a tabula rasa "is pervaded by traditional concepts and...horizons and traditional angles of approach." An understanding shaped and governed by the past plays its enabling role whether the individual recognizes and welcomes it or not, whether he makes the past an object of study and cultivates an interest in tradition or abandons history to the historian or philosopher. An individual or a people or an entire era can lack historical consciousness, philosophy of history, and historiography, and can remain indifferent to tradition only because the human being is historical "in the ground of its being.". (shrink)

How do we and should we decide what is morally right and what is morally wrong? For much of human history, the teachings of religion were presumed to provide either the answer, or much of the answer. Over time, two developments challenged this. The first was the establishment of the discipline of moral philosophy. Foundational texts, such as Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and the growth of coherent, nonreligious approaches to ethics, notably utilitarianism, served to (...) marginalize the role of religion. And then, second, the twentieth century saw the rapid growth of evolutionary biology with an enthusiastic presumption that biology was the source of ethics. Here, I begin by discussing these developments and then examine the extent to which religion is still needed for a coherent account of ethics. (shrink)

The recent publication of the stenographer's transcript of Whitehead's guest lecture on “social ethics” has shed new light on the relation between his metaphysics and ethics. Instead of including ethics in his philosophy, Whitehead treats it as a distinct, specialized science that does not share in the universality of metaphysics. The present article argues that an analysis of his lecture shows that a nonindividualist Whiteheadian ethics is possible without rupturing the coherence of (...) Whitehead's system or contradicting the ontological or subjectivist principle. As part of a larger transition in Whitehead's thinking during the years 1925–1927, he reformulates the notion of the environment as inheritance and is therefore able to pose the question of the endurance of values at the level of society, which is the purview of ethics. Reconstructing the metaphysical background may provide a “stimulus to the imagination” for ethical debates today, especially in the field of environmental ethics. (shrink)

This book remedies the absence in the history of analytic philosophy of a detailed examination of G. E. Moore’s philosophical views as they developed between 1894 and 1902. This period saw the inauguration of analytic philosophy through the work of Moore and Bertrand Russell. Moore’s early views are examined in detail through unpublished archival material, including surviving letters, diaries, notes of lectures attended, papers for Cambridge societies, and drafts of early work, in order to revise the established view that the (...) origin of analytic philosophy at Cambridge was an abrupt split from F. H. Bradley’s Absolute Idealism. Traditional accounts of this period have highlighted the anti-psychologism of Frege’s logic but have not explored the impact of this movement more broadly. Anti-psychologism was a key feature of the work of Moore’s teachers on the nature of the mind and its objects, in their interpretation of Kant, and in ethics. Moore’s teachers G.F. Stout and James Ward were significant contributors to the late 19th century debates in mental science and the developing new science of psychology. Henry Sidgwick’s criticisms of Kant and Bradley and his leading work in ethics were key influences on Moore. Moore’s Trinity Fellowship Dissertations are essential historical evidence of the development of Moore's new theory of judgment, a theory whose defining role in the origins of analytic philosophy cannot be overstated. Moore’s study of Kant in his dissertations ultimately formed the groundwork for his Principia Ethica, which evolved from ideas that manifested in Moore’s earliest Apostles’ papers, developed through his dissertations, and were refined through his Elements of Ethics lectures. This monumental work of early twentieth century ethics is thus shown to be the culmination of Moore’s early philosophical development. (shrink)

This pedagogical study analyzes and attempts to solve some difficulties of teaching Immanuel Kant’s Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Even though there are obstacles to teaching Kant’s ethics, I argue that active learning techniques can overcome such obstacles. The active learning approach holds that students learn better by doing (in hands-on exercises) than just by listening (to a professor’s lectures). Twelve lesson plans are outlined in this article. The lesson plans are activities to explore and learn, then (...) evaluate, and finally reflect and review Kant’s ethics. (shrink)

Masaryk’s philosophical approach to reality is largely characterised by its orientation towards the positivism of Auguste Comte, which Masaryk sought to offset with the psychologism of J. S. Mill. The combination of these positivist approaches became the positive starting point for Masaryk’s ethics. But that was not the only influence on his ethics. Masaryk’s German translation of Hume’s book, titled Eine Untersuchung über die Prinzipien der Moral von David Hume (1883), reveals that the main stimuli that shaped Masaryk’s (...) ideas about ethics came from David Hume. Although the need for scientific evidence became a fundamental principle of Masaryk’s thought, the need to objectively anchor ethics in rational theism necessitated in this area a departure from his positivist outlook. Masaryk’s lectures on practical philosophy attest to this fact. The reason for his departure from a positivist stance was due to the metaphysical nature of his concept of psychology. (shrink)

Moving back and forth between the history of philosophy and the contributions of philosophers in his own day, Durkheim takes up topics as diverse as philosophical psychology, logic, ethics, and metaphysics, and seeks to articulate a unified philosophical position. Remarkably, in these lectures, given more than a decade before the publication of his groundbreaking book, The Division of Labour in Society, the 'social realism' that is so characteristic of his later work - where he insists, famously, that social (...) facts cannot be reduced to psychological or economic ones, and that such facts constrain human action in important ways - is totally absent in these early lectures. For this reason, they will be of special interest to students of the history of the social sciences, for they shed important light on the course of Durkheim's intellectual development. (shrink)

In this article, the author aims to demonstrate how Agamben’s concept of Homo Sacer is ideally epitomized by a soldier in war. A soldier in war holds a peculiar position, as killing of soldiers is considered neither illegal by laws nor immoral by ethics, and so a soldier is not considered to be legally or morally “guilty” in the usual sense of the word if he or she kills another soldier in war. The author analyzes the notion of Homo (...) Sacer – a figure representing a human that can be killed without the killer being punished, but at the same time someone who cannot be sacrificed – and further demonstrates that a soldier in war can be said to hold precisely such a status. The reason why a soldier cannot be sacrificed resides in the fact that he has already been “sacrificed to war” by his own society, in exchange for the safety of all other members of society. Perceiving a soldier as Homo Sacer provides a novel explanation and an additional argument for the moral symmetry of combatants, one of the pillars of non-revisionist Just War Theory, as all soldiers can be understood as persons sacrificed by their own societies. (shrink)

A fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and of the Royal Society, William Clifford (1845–79) made his reputation in applied mathematics, but his interests ranged far more widely, encompassing ethics, evolution, metaphysics and philosophy of mind. This posthumously collected two-volume work, first published in 1879, bears witness to the dexterity and eclecticism of this Victorian thinker, whose commitment to the most abstract principles of mathematics and the most concrete details of human experience resulted in vivid and often unexpected arguments. (...) Volume 2 shows Clifford's thorough engagement with scientific thought as a method for illuminating ethical and moral questions. Essays such as 'Body and Mind', 'On the Scientific Basis of Morals' and 'The Ethics of Belief' all variously demonstrate Clifford's core tenet: that beliefs - whether they guide human action or scientific enquiry - 'can never suffer from investigation'. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Spinoza: Une Lecture d'AristoteYitzhak MelamedFrédéric Manzini. Spinoza: Une Lecture d'Aristote. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009. Pp. 334. Paper, $39.95.The occasion that prompted the current study was the discovery of a tiny typo in the text of Spinoza's Cogitata Metaphysica—the appendix to his 1663 book, Descartes' Principle of Philosophy. As it turned out, this typo, a reference to Book XI instead of Book XII of Aristotle's (...) Metaphysics, was inadvertently reproduced by Spinoza from a contemporary edition of Aristotle's works, allowing Manzini to identify precisely the edition used by Spinoza as the 1548 edition of Aristotle's works printed in Basel by Johannes Oporinus. It also led him to conclude that, contrary to the belief of many, Spinoza read Aristotle's text very closely, and convinced him of the importance of studying the dialogue between the two great philosophers.The book is comprised of three parts, reversing the order of Spinoza's presentation of his philosophy in the Ethics. The first part discusses Spinoza's ethical and political theories—where, the author claims, the influence of Aristotle is most manifest—against the background of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. Here, much attention is given to the notions of the summum bonum and beatitude. The second part discusses Aristotelian and Spinozistic theories of knowledge. In the third and final part, dedicated to metaphysics and first philosophy, the author compares the philosophers' absolutely impersonal conceptions of God, examines their conceptions of substance, and develops a reading of what he calls Spinoza's "ousio-theology" (305).According to Manzini, Aristotle was one of Spinoza's first major philosophical interlocutors, and there is no doubt he is right about this. This conclusion, however, is unsurprising, [End Page 126] since seventeenth-century philosophers, whether devoted Aristotelians or determined anti-Aristotelians, conversed in an Aristotelian philosophical language. Manzini shows that Spinoza engaged directly with Aristotle's text, but also tries to substantiate an even stronger claim by stressing the agreements between the two philosophers.There are two reasons that make it difficult to see Spinoza as being consciously and positively influenced by Aristotle, however. First, Spinoza's dialogue with his philosophical predecessors is, without exception, highly critical and polemical. He does not usually mention philosophers with whom he agrees (e.g. Crescas and Machiavelli). Secondly, several of Spinoza's explicit references to Aristotle are highly critical. Consider, for example, Spinoza's claim, in a letter to Hugo Boxel, that "the authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates carries little weight with me" (Letter 56), or his mockery of the "delusions of the Aristotelians and Platonists" (Theological Political Treatise [TTP], Pref.; cf. ch. 13). Manzini suggests that in these passages Spinoza is not so much addressing Aristotle, but rather using him as a foil to target medieval Aristotelianism (13). Looking closely at the context, my impression is that he is right about the passages in the TTP, but not about the quote from Letter 56. More importantly, the claim that Spinoza uses Aristotle's name as a foil is a double-edged sword that may also serve to undermine Manzini's argument. Throughout the book, Manzini points out interesting and significant similarities between Spinoza's and Aristotle's texts, but to establish direct positive influence one must consider and rule out mediating agents. In the present case there is plenty of evidence that Spinoza read medieval Hebrew Aristotelians closely. Unfortunately, most of the Hebrew authors mentioned by Spinoza were never translated into modern European languages, and there are very few, if any, good studies of Spinoza's dialogue with these texts; in the absence of such translations and studies, some of Manzini's conclusions must remain tentative.Manzini's erudition and analysis of the text are impressive. For example, near the end of his celebrated Letter on the Infinite, Spinoza criticizes "recent Peripatetics" for misunderstanding the ancient method of proving God's existence, citing Crescas's correct formulation of the ancient proof. Manzini rightly points out that the proof Spinoza ascribes to the "recent Peripatetics" was in fact Aristotle's, while the alleged "ancient" proof (which allows for actual infinity and relies on Avicennian... (shrink)

“Discourse, Metaphysics,and Hermeneutics of the Self” deals with the connection between the hermeneutics of the self, as constituted in the ethical-anthropological framework of _Oneself as Another_ (1990), and Ricoeur’s conception of a metaphysics of human agency as developed within this period of his work. It relates to his inquiries in the fields of ontology and metaphysics, from the lectures entitled _Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote_ (1953-1954) – translated as _Being, Essence and Substance in Plato (...) and Aristotle_ (2013)—, up to “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993) published in the _Revue de métaphysique et de morale _– translated into English as “From Metaphysics to Moral Philosophy” (1996)—, via the article “Ontologie” (1972) for _Encyclopaedia Universalis_, the last chapter of _The Rule of Metaphor_ (1975), and the first section of the conclusions to the third volume of _Time and Narrative_ (1985). Ricœur aims at determining a specific kind of philosophical discourse as a common ground for the perspectives stemming from a hermeneutic phenomenology and from a more speculative ontological-metaphysical research. (shrink)

A fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and of the Royal Society, William Clifford made his reputation in applied mathematics, but his interests ranged far more widely, encompassing ethics, evolution, metaphysics and philosophy of mind. This posthumously collected two-volume work, first published in 1879, bears witness to the dexterity and eclecticism of this Victorian thinker, whose commitment to the most abstract principles of mathematics and the most concrete details of human experience resulted in vivid and often unexpected arguments. Volume (...) 2 shows Clifford's thorough engagement with scientific thought as a method for illuminating ethical and moral questions. Essays such as 'Body and Mind', 'On the Scientific Basis of Morals' and 'The Ethics of Belief' all variously demonstrate Clifford's core tenet: that beliefs - whether they guide human action or scientific enquiry - 'can never suffer from investigation'. (shrink)

“Discourse, Metaphysics,and Hermeneutics of the Self” deals with the connection between the hermeneutics of the self, as constituted in the ethical-anthropological framework of Oneself as Another (1990), and Ricoeur’s conception of a metaphysics of human agency as developed within this period of his work. It relates to his inquiries in the fields of ontology and metaphysics, from the lectures entitled Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote (1953-1954), up to “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993) (...) published in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, via the article “Ontologie” (1972) for Encyclopaedia Universalis, the last chapter of The Rule of Metaphor (1975), and the first section of the conclusions to the third volume of Time and Narrative (1985). Ricœur aims at determining a specific kind of philosophical discourse as a common ground for the perspectives stemming from a hermeneutic phenomenology and from a more speculative ontological-metaphysical research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd 188 Reviews 1 A.yW. Brown, The Metaphysical Society (New York: Octagon, 1973), pp. 180–1. THE ETHICS OF BELIEF Sylvia Nickerson History & Philosophy of Science & Technology / U. of Toronto Toronto, on, Canada m5s 1k1 [email protected] Timothy J. Madigan. W.yK. CliVord and “The Ethics of Beliefz”. Newcastle, uk: CambridgeScholars Publishing, 2009. Pp. [x], (...) 202. isbn 1-84718-503-7. £29.99; us$44.99 (hb). The mathematician William Kingdon CliTord (1845–1879) is generally remembered as a potentially great man whose life was cut short before his genius was fully realized. During his lifetime CliTord was well known in London as a public intellectual and noted authority on science. He was also an iconoclast, a leader in the application of Darwinian principles to areas beyond biology, and a proponent of non-Euclidean geometry. Unlike other agnostics, CliTord did not mourn the loss of his religious belief, nor did he worry that a secularized society would bring about general social decay. While other scientiWc naturalists worried that a collapse of religion would destroy morality and lead to social disintegration, CliTord willingly ceded the universal truths religion oTered, embracing the uncertainty that scientiWc knowledge actually entailed. He even dared to call himself an atheist. However, CliTord’s death at age 34 curtailed the trace of his thought. What remains is consigned to his scant private notebooks and collected works. Perhaps it was the brevity of his life that has led to his neglect within the history of science; no comprehensive appraisal of his mathematical work has been written. CliTord’sbest-knownnon-mathematical statementisthat“itiswrongalways, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insuUcient evidence.” This was the statement he defended in his lecture “The Ethics of Beliefz”, which he delivered to London’s Metaphysical Society in 1876. The Metaphysical Society, founded in 1869 to promote discussion between religious believers and scientiWc rationalists, ceased operation in 1880 after members could not Wnd enough common ground to begin debate. The rationalist position CliTord argues in “The Ethics of Beliefz” stands on the far side of the spectrum within this discourse. CliTord’s immoderate stance, along with his use of biblical rhetoric to argue a secularist position, was calculated to provoke conservative intellectuals and institutions.1 When his essay appeared in the January 1877 issue April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd Reviews 189 of Contemporary Review, it proved antagonistic enough that it led in part to the dismissal of James Knowles as editor. Timothy Madigan’s book W.yK. CliVord and “The Ethics of Beliefz”z provides an introduction to and analysis of CliTord’s ethical philosophy. His goal is to outline the historical context from which CliTord’s most famous essay arose, and to analyze the merits and demerits of its argument through the viewpoints of critics and freethinkers from the nineteenth century to the present. Madigan gives a brief history of the Victorian crisis of faith, CliTord’s mathematical work, and the biographical details of his life. He presents the argument CliTord makes within “The Ethics of Beliefz”, and outlines the critical response from his contemporaries, including founding members of the Metaphysical Society William George Ward and Richard H. Hutton, poet Matthew Arnold, physiologist George John Romanes, and American psychologist and philosopher William James. Madigan also discusses the positions argued by other rationalists in the 1870s,1880sandlater(Leslie Stephen, Karl Pearson, FriedrichNietzsche, Charles Peirce and Bertrand Russell) and by modern philosophers who have contributed to the rationalist/religionist debate (C.yS. Lewis, J.yL. Mackie, Michael Martin, Peter van Inwagen, Susan Haack, Anthony Quinton, and Lorraine Code). In Chapter 6 Madigan presents his own defence of CliTord’s ethics of belief. While early sections of the book provide a helpful summary of previously published work, I found Madigan’s discussion of CliTord’s writings on psychology and theory of mind particularly valuable (pp. 58–65). Madigan notes positively that CliTord’s contribution helped steer the early development... (shrink)

A fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and of the Royal Society, William Clifford made his reputation in applied mathematics, but his interests ranged far more widely, encompassing ethics, evolution, metaphysics and philosophy of mind. This posthumously collected two-volume work, first published in 1879, bears witness to the dexterity and eclecticism of this Victorian thinker, whose commitment to the most abstract principles of mathematics and the most concrete details of human experience resulted in vivid and often unexpected arguments. Volume (...) 1 includes a detailed biographical introduction by Clifford's colleague, Frederick Pollock, who situates his close friend's interests in Darwin and Spinoza within a larger, life-long devotion to the principles of scientific enquiry and experiment. This volume also features two important essays, 'On Some of the Conditions of Mental Development', his first public lecture delivered at the Royal Institute in London, and 'The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences'. (shrink)

Schelling’s middle period works have always been a source of fascination: they mark a break with the idealism (in both senses of the word) of his early works and the Fichtean and then Hegelian tradition; while they are not weighed down by the reactionary burden of his late lectures on theology and mythology. But they have been equally a source of perplexity. The central work of this period, the Essay on Human Freedom (1809) takes as its topic the moral problem (...) of freedom, but spends much of its time telling a mystical-metaphysical story about the creation of the world that attempts to paint a picture of a kind of irreducible metaphysical contingency in nature. What is the relation between the moral and the metaphysical elements of the Freedom essay? It has never been obvious. But some recent Anglophone scholarship suggests an answer. In her Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling and Kierkegaard (2006) Michelle Kosch presents a strong case for the view that Schelling’s Freedom essay is motivated by a critique of Kant’s conception of autonomy in ethics. The idea is that Kant’s problems start not if he fails to show that it is rational to be moral, but if he succeeds. For if he does, then it is irrational to be immoral, and hence it is impossible for a rational agent to act immorally: an act not in conformity with duty is evidence of irrationality (perhaps one’s rational agency has been thwarted by pathological inclinations). This is broadly the Socratic position: evil, as a knowing immoral act, is not possible. Officially Kant rejects the classical view, most explicitly in his 1793 Religion with the Bounds of Mere Reason, for a Christian position in which freedom is understood as the freedom to choose between good and evil without thereby abandoning one’s agency. But he has no obvious means for doing so. Kosch attempts to show that Schelling comes, by 1809, to identify his early work with something like this Kantian dilemma: we are as badly off when it comes to our freedom if we are pushed around by reasons as if we are pushed around by causes: the Hegelian ruse of reason is as inimical to our agency as phenomenal determinism. The Freedom essay is the result of Schelling’s attempt to defend a muscular, Christian conception of the possibility of evil. Nevertheless, for Kosch, Schelling’s move to the metaphysical level is still problematic: just where one would expect an account of norms that does not infer them from our rational autonomy, we get, puzzlingly, a cosmology. I will argue that Kosch’s matrix for interpreting Schelling in fact does give us a way of understanding Schelling’s metaphysics of contingency. In broad outline, Schelling’s argument is that our choice of metaphysical schema is constrained by a correct understanding of agency: the world cannot be causally determined because that is inconsistent with our understanding of ourselves as agents; but equally the world cannot be rationally determined, and for the same reason. Schelling’s metaphysics of contingency is an unpacking of the consequences of this inference, and not a botched attempt to ground values outside of rational autonomy. (shrink)

Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues, Fifth Edition, features sixty-nine selections organized into three parts, providing instructors with great flexibility in designing and teaching a variety of courses in moral philosophy. Spanning 2,500 years of ethical theory, the first part, Historical Sources, ranges from ancient Greece to the twentieth century. It moves from classical thought through medieval views to modern theories, culminating with leading nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers. The second part, Modern Ethical Theory, includes many of the most important (...) essays of the past century. The discussion of utilitarianism, Kantianism, egoism, and relativism continues in the work of major contemporary philosophers, while landmark selections reflect concern with moral language and the justification of morality. The concepts of duty, justice, and rights are explored, as well as recent views on cultural relativism and an ethic influenced by feminist concerns. In the third part, Contemporary Moral Problems, the readings present the current debates over abortion, euthanasia, famine relief, animal rights, environmentalism, and the use of torture in interrogations, as well as essays on death and the meaning of life. Wherever possible, each reading is printed in its entirety. The fifth edition features new readings from Cicero, Barbara Herman, and Judith Jarvis Thomson; an expanded selection from Joseph Butler's Fifteen Sermons; and a new translation of Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. In addition, the book is supplemented for the first time by a robust support package. An Instructor's Resource CD contains reading summaries, essay questions, multiple-choice and true/false questions, PowerPoint-based lecture outlines, and relevant website links. A Companion Website at www.oup.com/us/cahn provides most of the material from the Instructor's Resource CD along with student resources including interactive self-quizzes, questions for discussion, and helpful links. (shrink)

Part I: Consciousness and the metaphysics of experience. Orientations. What I believe. The privacy of experience. Final causes. The importance of subjectivity : an inaugural lecture. Is consciousness mysterious? Consciousness. The distinctiveness of American philosophy. The world of description and the world of acquaintance -- Part II: The metaphysics of time and the absolute. The unreality of time. Ideal immortality. Russell and Bradley on relations. The self and its world in Bradley and Husserl. Absolute idealism. Pantheism -- (...) Part III: Ethics, animal rights, and the environment. The greatest happiness principle. Is the esse of intrinsic value percipi? Pleasure, pain and value. Metaphysics, physicalism, and animal rights. Vivisection, morals, medicine : commentary from an antivivisectionist philosopher. Non-human rights : an idealist perspective. Are there intrinsic values in nature? An idealist's prayer for the world. (shrink)

Moving back and forth between the history of philosophy and the contributions of philosophers in his own day, Durkheim takes up topics as diverse as philosophical psychology, logic, ethics, and metaphysics, and seeks to articulate a unified philosophical position. Remarkably, in these lectures, given more than a decade before the publication of his groundbreaking book, The Division of Labour in Society, the 'social realism' that is so characteristic of his later work - where he insists, famously, that social (...) facts cannot be reduced to psychological or economic ones, and that such facts constrain human action in important ways - is totally absent in these early lectures. For this reason, they will be of special interest to students of the history of the social sciences, for they shed important light on the course of Durkheim's intellectual development. (shrink)

This important collection of more than twenty original essays by prominent Kant scholars covers the multiple aspects of Kant’s teaching in relation to his published works. With the Academy edition’s continuing publication of Kant’s lectures, the role of his lecturing activity has been drawing more and more deserved attention. Several of Kant’s lectures on metaphysics, logic, ethics, anthropology, theology, and pedagogy have been translated into English, and important studies have appeared in many languages. But why study the lectures? (...) When they are read in light of Kant’s published writings, the lectures offer a new perspective of Kant’s philosophical development, clarify points in the published texts, consider topics there unexamined, and depict the intellectual background in richer detail. And the lectures are often more accessible to readers than the published works. This book discusses all areas of Kant's lecturing activity. Some essays even analyze in detail the content of Kant's courses and the role of textbooks written by key authors such as Baumgarten, helping us understand Kant’s thought in its intellectual and historical contexts. Contributors: Huaping Lu-Adler; Henny Blomme ; Robert Clewis; Alix Cohen; Corey Dyck; Faustino Fabbianelli; Norbert Fischer; Courtney Fugate; Paul Guyer; Robert Louden; Antonio Moretto; Steve Naragon; Christian Onof; Stephen Palmquist; Riccardo Pozzo; Frederick Rauscher; Dennis Schulting; Oliver Sensen; Susan Shell; Werner Stark; John Zammito; Günter Zöller. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Metaphysics of Practice: Writings on Action, Community, and Obligation by Wilfrid SellarsRonald LoefflerSELLARS, Wilfrid. The Metaphysics of Practice: Writings on Action, Community, and Obligation. Edited by Kyle Ferguson and Jeremy Randel Koons. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023. 745 pp. Cloth, $115.00Wilfrid Sellars thought deeply about ethics, practical reasoning, and intentional agency throughout his career and published extensively on these issues, with much additional (...) unpublished material housed in the Archives of Scientific Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. In prominent places Sellars indicates that he regards his ethics as the key to his overarching project of reconciling our manifest nature as norm-governed rational beings with his nominalistic scientific naturalism. Yet with a few noteworthy exceptions, Sellars scholars have only very recently begun to seriously grapple with Sellars’s practical philosophy. No one has done more to initiate this recent trend than Jeremy Koons, who, together with Kyle Ferguson, collects in this volume virtually all of Sellars’s practical philosophical works, including approximately 200 pages of hitherto unpublished material—mostly correspondences with R. M. Hare, Robert Binkley, Hector-Neri Castañeda, Bruce Aune, and David Solomon.Sellars’s published practical philosophical writings are grouped thematically into four parts. A fifth part is dedicated to the unpublished writings. The editors also provide a sixty-page introduction, which offers a synopsis of Sellars’s overall vision of us as practically rational moral [End Page 728] agents, followed by summaries of each of the nineteen essays and the correspondences published in this volume.Sellars thinks of moral ought-judgments as simultaneously motivationally internalistic (with traditional emotivism) and as truth-apt and more or less rational (with traditional cognitivism). His key idea to combine these seemingly incongruent commitments is to regard moral ought-judgments as a species of we-intentions. Since intentions generally are “conceptually tied” to practice, in the sense that (absent interferences or defeaters) they determine proper action in accordance with norms of practical reasoning, we get, in this sense, a version of motivational internalism. Sellars models these normative connections in terms of a nuanced logic of practical reasoning—basically a logic of means–ends reasoning—that is largely parasitic on the logic of theoretical reasoning. This logic is cast in terms of shall-statements, which are linguistic expressions of intentions of the forms “Shall-be [p]” and “Shall [I do A if in C],” where the “Shall-be”s and “Shall”s express the states of intending and the square-bracketed portions the intended contents. Logically proper practical reasoning bottoms out in intentions that immediately give rise to actions (volitions), to be expressed by shall-statements of the form “Shall [I do A now].” Sellars makes the case for the truth-aptness of moral ought-judgments by treating them as a species of we-intentions. Such moral we-intentions are expressed by statements of the form “Shall(we) [We, any of us, do A if in C],” where both the “we” in the content expression and the “we” indexed to the “shall” are maximally inclusive, comprising every rational being at all. This appears to be what today we would call a combined mode and content account of moral we-intentions, where firs-tperson plural elements are built both into the mode of moral we-intending and the content of moral we-intentions. The truth-aptness of moral we-intentions, Sellars thinks, is secured by the fact that the first-person plural elements of the intention include every rational being at all. Sellars maintains that, due to this maximal inclusion, moral we-intentions are apt to yield genuine interpersonal agreement or disagreement (contra I-intentions) and they ground, via what seems to be a transcendental argument, Sellars’s fundamental principle of morality, expressed as “Shall(we) [We, any of us, maximize our general welfare]).” This principle provides the standard of objective moral correctness for any other moral judgment.Part 1 of the volume includes six essays in which Sellars offers comprehensive articulations of this overall picture, culminating in “Objectivity, Intersubjectivity, and the Moral Point of View” (OIM), the stand-alone seventh chapter of Science and Metaphysics, based on Sellars’s 1965–66 John Locke Lectures... (shrink)

“Discourse, Metaphysics,and Hermeneutics of the Self” deals with the connection between the hermeneutics of the self, as constituted in the ethical-anthropological framework of Oneself as Another (1990), and Ricoeur’s conception of a metaphysics of human agency as developed within this period of his work. It relates to his inquiries in the fields of ontology and metaphysics, from the lectures entitled Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote (1953-1954), up to “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993) (...) published in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, via the article “Ontologie” (1972) for Encyclopaedia Universalis, the last chapter of The Rule of Metaphor (1975), and the first section of the conclusions to the third volume of Time and Narrative (1985). Ricœur aims at determining a specific kind of philosophical discourse as a common ground for the perspectives stemming from a hermeneutic phenomenology and from a more speculative ontological-metaphysical research. (shrink)

A fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and of the Royal Society, William Clifford made his reputation in applied mathematics, but his interests ranged far more widely, encompassing ethics, evolution, metaphysics and philosophy of mind. This posthumously collected two-volume work, first published in 1879, bears witness to the dexterity and eclecticism of this Victorian thinker, whose commitment to the most abstract principles of mathematics and the most concrete details of human experience resulted in vivid and often unexpected arguments. Edited (...) by Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock, the essays show Clifford's thorough engagement with scientific thought as a method for illuminating ethical and moral questions. They include 'On Some of the Conditions of Mental Development', 'On the Scientific Basis of Morals' and 'The Ethics of Belief'. Pollock also supplied a biography which focuses on Clifford's devotion to the principles of scientific enquiry and experiment. (shrink)

Now available Open Access! See the Bloomsburycollections URL below. -/- Correct bibliographical information is as follows: Gottfried Achenwall, _Natural Law: A Translation of the Textbook for Kant's Lectures on Legal and Political Philosophy_, edited by Pauline Kleingeld, translated by Corinna Vermeulen, with an Introduction by Paul Guyer. London: Bloomsbury, 2020. -/- As the first translation into any modern language of Achenwall’s Ius naturae, from the 1763 edition used by Immanuel Kant, this is an essential work for anyone interested in Kant, (...) the natural law tradition or the history of legal and political theory. For over twenty years, Kant used this book as the basis for his lectures on natural law. It influenced his legal and political philosophy as well as his ethics, and it is indispensable for understanding Kant’s Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law and his Metaphysics of Morals. -/- Articulating his theory of natural law with clear definitions and precise distinctions, Achenwall offers a lucid account that includes instructive comparisons with the work of Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Wolff and others. The volume also contains an Introduction by the eminent Kant scholar Paul Guyer, comparing Achenwall’s theory to the legal and political philosophy of Kant’s Doctrine of Right, and a concordance correlating Achenwall’s Natural Law to Kant’s Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law. (shrink)

James Frederick Ferrier is probably best known for the idealism he presents in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness and Institutes of Metaphysic, in which Ferrier critiques and offers an alternative to Common Sense Realism – the dominant school of thought in Scotland in the 18thand early 19thcenturies – spearheaded by Thomas Reid and his followers. What has received significantly less attention in the literature, however, is Ferrier's 1866 Lectures on Greek Philosophy, which serves as an important point of (...) connection between the moral philosophy that Ferrier develops in the Introduction and Institutes and what Ferrier takes to be the ethics that Socrates taught and according to which he lived. In this paper, I examine Plato's early dialogues in order to demonstrate that Ferrier's ethics should be understood as a descendent of Socratic ethics insofar as both Ferrier and Socrates endorse the view that individual freedom is only possible through a life of thought that transcends the particularities of sensation. (shrink)

This volume unites Peter Winch's previously unpublished work on Baruch de Spinoza. The primary source for the text is a series of seminars on Spinoza that Winch gave, first at the University of Swansea in 1982 and then at King's College London in 1989. What emerges is an original interpretation of Spinoza's work that demonstrates his continued relevance to contemporary issues in metaphysics, epistemology and ethics, and establishes connections to other philosophers - not only Spinoza's predecessors such as (...) René Descartes, but also important 20th Century philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Simone Weil. Alongside Winch's lectures, the volume contains an interpretive essay by David Cockburn, and an introduction by the editors. (shrink)

Lectures delivered under the auspices of the University of Poona.

This paper begins with a pressing question for contemporary philosophy: What does it mean to read Spinoza’s Ethics today? Before we can address this particular question, we pose another, one possibly prior, question. The question is situated within Spinozism itself. It asks, ‘What does it mean to read, for Spinoza?’ Given Spinoza’s commitment to the theory of parallelism, reading affects both the body and the mind. We first show how an explicit formulation of the three kinds of material bodies (...) allows us to understand the process by which the meaning of a text can affect the body of the reader. We then show how the three kinds of knowledge evince the order in which textual meaning can affect the mind of the reader. We then claim that these tripartite orders map directly onto each other. After demonstrating the structural parallelism at the corporeal and cognitive levels, we return to further characterize the nature of the meaning of the meaning of a text in order to understand what it means to read, for Spinoza. We conclude with an observation about the necessary interrelatedness of metaphysics and ethics. (shrink)

The purpose of __Aquinas's Ethics__ is to place Thomas Aquinas's moral theory in its full philosophical and theological context and to do so in a way that makes Aquinas readily accessible to students and interested general readers, including those encountering Aquinas for the first time. Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke begin by explaining Aquinas's theories of the human person and human action, since these ground his moral theory. In their interpretation, Aquinas's theological commitments crucially shape his (...) account of the human person, human capacities for action, and human flourishing. The authors develop a comprehensive picture of Aquinas's thought, which is designed to help students understand how his concept of happiness and the good life are part of a coherent, theologically-informed worldview. Many studies of Aquinas naturally focus on certain areas of his thought and tend to assume a general knowledge of the whole. __Aquinas's Ethics_ _takes the opposite approach: it intentionally links his metaphysics and anthropology to his action theory and ethics to illuminate how the moral theory is built on foundations laid elsewhere. The authors emphasize the integration of concepts of virtue, natural law, and divine grace within Aquinas's ethics, rather than treating such topics in isolation or opposition. Their approach, presented in clear and deliberately non-specialist language, reveals the coherent nature of Aquinas's account of the moral life and of what fulfills us as human beings. The result is a rich and engaging framework for further investigation of Aquinas's thought and its applications. _"___Aquinas’s Ethics_ _is a perfect introduction to one of the most sophisticated and influential ethical systems in Western thought. DeYoung, McCluskey, and Van Dyke capture the brilliant clarity of Aquinas’s moral vision, offering an illuminating perspective true to both the theoretical depth and practical richness of Aquinas’s writings. Those new to Aquinas’s ideas will find this book eminently readable. Everyone—students and scholars alike—will appreciate its direct, distinctive voice and clear philosophical intelligence." —_Scott MacDonald, Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies, Cornell University_ "__Aquinas's Ethics_ _is an excellent contribution to the literature on Aquinas and ethics, providing an integrated and robust account of the relationship between a metaphysics of human nature, natural law theory, and virtue theory. Showing these inextricable connections, it is very much like the work of St. Thomas himself, and suggests why so many lesser theories of ethics are unsatisfying for their lack of depth and comprehensive reach." —_John Kavanaugh, S.J., Saint Louis University_ “DeYoung, McCluskey, and Van Dyke have written the ideal introduction to Aquinas’s ethics, situating it in the broader context of his thinking about human nature and action. Although Aquinas cared more about—and wrote more about—ethics than about any other philosophical topic, it remains the most unjustly neglected aspect of his thought. I know of no better guide to that territory than this book.” —_Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado at Boulder_. (shrink)

This article addresses Franklin Gamwell's critique of Alasdair MacIntyre's account of the nature of rational justification. I argue that MacIntyreans have good reasons to take seriously Gamwell's critique, and thus to reformulate MacIntyre's position to make clear that that position does not rest on a denial of all a priori claims. The author outlines such a reformulation, drawing heavily on MacIntyre's account (in his 1990 Aquinas Lecture) of the place of a priori claims within the development of rational traditions (...) of inquiry. When thus rethought, MacIntyre's position grounds a twofold response to Gamwell's critique. (shrink)

In this paper, I do three things. First, I unpack and outline an intriguing but neglected aspect of the thought of the Frankfurt School critical theorist Theodor W. Adorno—namely, his critique of Aristotle, which can be found in two of his lecture series: the unpublished 1956 lectures on moral philosophy and the 1965 lectures published as Metaphysics: Concept and Problems. Second, I demonstrate how Adorno's Aristotle critique constitutes a powerful critique of contemporary neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism, of the sort (...) advocated by thinkers such as Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson and John McDowell. Third, I expound upon where this critique leaves the prospect of formulating a robust ethical naturalism more generally. (shrink)

While the story of Stanislav Petrov – the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel who likely saved the world from nuclear holocaust in 1983 – is often trotted out to advocate for the view that human beings ought to be kept “in the loop” of automated weapons’ responses, I argue that the episode in fact belies this reading. By attending more closely to the features of this event – to Petrov’s professional background, to his familiarity with the warning system, and to his decisions (...) to defy his protocol – it becomes clear that Petrov was not seamlessly working “in his loop,” but reassessing it entirely. I claim that this exhibits a paradox intrinsic to all automated loops: namely, that their optimum function in fact rests on unforeseen human interventions that cannot be reliably codified ex ante, that is, that good judgment cannot simply be “programmed into” their protocols. This dependence, moreover, reveals automation’s ineluctable need for virtue ethics – not in the usual sense (whereby ethics deliberates about, say, possible damages and loss of life), but in the sense that ethical judgment, rightly understood, entails the reassessment of all of the conditions surrounding a decision, including whether a protocol should be followed at all. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nonviolence—A Brief History: The Warsaw Lectures by John Howard YoderCarter AikinNonviolence—A Brief History: The Warsaw Lectures John Howard Yoder Edited By Paul Martens, Matthew Porter, and Myles Werntz Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2010. 150 pp. $29.95This helpful collection of lectures, delivered during a 1983 Polish Ecumenical Council (PEC) conference in Warsaw, displays John Howard Yoder’s emerging conviction that nonviolent action is not only a faithful response but (...) also an anthropologically natural and effective instrument of social change. Yoder constructively narrates the joining of theological and philosophical clarity about the importance of nonviolence with realizations of its social effectiveness as this connection blossomed in the turmoil of the twentieth century.The introduction nicely situates these lectures in their original social and ecumenical contexts, both of which turn out to be tremendously important. Yoder gave these lectures just weeks before Pope John Paul II met with the PEC for the first time and during the period when the US Catholic Bishop’s letter, “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response” was being formed. Additionally, in 1983 the vulnerable Polish Communist Party was trying to suppress the rising Solidarity Movement, the country’s first noncommunist trade union. The movement’s protests and strikes had only recently gained media attention [End Page 216] and had, thus far, stopped short of violence. In its setting alone, the collection offers a Yoder rarely seen through his modern interpreters: Yoder is socially relevant in the highest degree, concerned with the effectiveness of non-violence as a means of change, more than willing to incorporate the wisdom of non-Christian masters, and attentive to the response of the entire church catholic. Here Yoder is no more the resident alien than Martin Luther King Jr. was on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial.Yoder begins with a three-lecture equation: Tolstoy + Gandhi = MLK. Tolstoy’s corrective interpretations of the Gospels—emphasizing the personhood of Jesus and “the ‘key’ to the Scripture message: the cure for evil is suffering” (21)—used nonviolence and the suffering of the persecuted as the fabric of moral progress. Gandhi “moves with Tolstoy, but beyond him” (24); he sees the power of truth and suffering as a natural force of good. Martin Luther King Jr. becomes Tolstoy + Gandhi, championing the power of love and non-violence as faithful but also practical and metaphysically natural. Much of the book provides theological, scriptural, socioanthropological, and historical arguments for why this is the case. Yoder’s treatments of the “powers” (chap. 8), just war (chap. 4), and the political nature of Jesus (chap. 7) are all paralleled elsewhere, but their inclusion is important to the modern reader who wishes to trace the logic of Yoder’s present argument and the evolution of his overall thought.In the closing chapters Yoder turns to flourishing nonviolence movements in Roman Catholicism that exhibit a “restoration of original Christianity” (120). He highlights several facets of Catholic nonviolent spirituality including the valuing of the cultivation of virtues (and the people who best exhibit them), the growth of the nonviolence movement among American Catholics, and the emergence of the Catholic Worker movement. In the final two chapters, Yoder brings into conversation a few Western theologians, the “increasingly important” products of American bishops (especially in their argument for the limits of just war thinking in the nuclear age), and two prophetic Latin American theologians: Dom Hélder Câmara and Adolfo Pérez Esquivel. Together this assembled chorus expresses the unique and hope-giving character of modern Catholic theologies of nonviolence: “love, not violence... will have the last word in history” (145).As a collection these lectures represent a part of Yoder’s emerging hope in the natural logic of nonviolence and its potential for effective social change. The fact that these lectures were delivered in such a highly charged setting provides a courageous and pastoral backdrop for what amounts to a rich metaphysics of nonviolence. [End Page 217]Carter AikinHastings CollegeCopyright © 2013 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2001) 300-302 [Access article in PDF] Louden, Robert. Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. 272. Cloth, $45.00. Kant's Impure Ethics sounds like the title of a very short book. Kant, strenuous advocate of purging everything empirical from moral theory in order to reveal the pure moral law a priori, is (...) assumed by many to reject impure ethics. Louden sets out to correct that image of Kant. Not only does Kant offer some impure, by which Louden means [End Page 300] empirical, ethics, Kant requires it in order for his moral system to work. Louden argues that impure ethics is an integral part of Kant's ethical project. Since as rational beings human beings are obligated to create a realm of ends, they need to be shown the specific manner in which they can create this moral realm in the specific world they inhabit. This impure ethics is never more than an application of the pure ethics and is not itself the source of any moral norms; Kant does not study human nature in order to establish or justify moral principles. Nor is impure ethics a sharpening of general duties to interpret them for our particular species or even groups within the species; Kant is not arguing that women or the French have duties peculiar to them. Rather impure ethics concerns the manner in which human beings can make morality efficacious in human life. Empirical knowledge of human beings can help determine the proper paths for humans to take in creating the realm of ends. Louden insists, as do some other recent commentators, that it is misleading to view the categorical imperative in isolation. Instead, Kant intended the categorical imperative to be understood in light of the development of a virtuous character. In its broadest sense the impure ethics concerns how all humans can develop that virtuous character.Kant himself divides philosophical ethics into the pure metaphysics of morals and the empirical, or impure, anthropology (in the "Preface" to the Groundwork among other places), but readers would look in vain for a single work by Kant which would fit under the latter heading. The Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, the most plausible candidate for such a text, contains much material only peripherally related to ethics and very little discussing specific moral applications. Given this lack of a published focus on the empirical side of Kant's ethics, Louden searches the Kantian corpus of books, essays, students' lecture notes, and the Reflexionen to collect relevant material. He finds five "fields of impurity": education, anthropology, art, religion, and history. Louden does an excellent service to Kant scholarship by drawing together these disparate sources and topics to highlight little-known areas of interest to Kant such as education reform and the role of an established church in promoting virtue. He defends Kant's theory against some charges of sexism and racism by noting that, although Kant was sexist and racist, he did always include all members of the species in his claims that moral progress would ultimately encompass everyone. The most worthwhile aspect of these particular discussions is the way Louden draws them together under a common theme pervading Kant's empirical ethics: the central role of progress. To work toward a realm of ends, human beings need to institute certain institutions in order to cultivate, civilize, and moralize themselves. These institutions will help to train individuals in the arts and sciences as a propaedeutic to ethical practices. The study of history shows that humans are destined to progress toward perfection, but actual progress depends upon concrete action. One is puzzled that here Louden includes Kant's discussion of a league of nations but not his direct political philosophy enjoining individuals to enter and support a state, the most important institution encountered in all of Kant's practical philosophy. Nonetheless Louden succeeds in revealing a unity in Kant's scattered hints on various topics.In the end, Louden concludes... (shrink)

Modern rationalism transformed the modern homeland to a discursive space and time by means of institutes governing the modern society in all its walks. Based on the Newtonian and Kantian conception of space and time the discursive field is just a scene wherein any human individual adopts stewardship to create progress by reducing landscape and non-human life to auxiliary items for human’s benefit. In contrast, Aldo Leopold considered humans, non human life and the landscape as mutually influencing participants and enlarged (...) ethical care to all living participants and the landscape, called ´the land´. Integrity and autonomy of the homeland are the central topics of Leopold’s land ethics. Baird Callicott suggested to complete it with new metaphysical conceptions of space and time. -/- We formulated a metaphysical background for Leopold’s land ethics by phenomenology of space and time based on the Leibnizian conception of space-time. The latter is constructed by particular places and events called ´ecotopois´ embracing all human participants, locals and foreigners in a varying symbolic temporal and spatial field of dynamic process of identification and self consciousness. Adopting Warwick Fox´ transpersonal identification idea non-human life and landscape enriches these processes. Finally, it is not a matter of conquering the land, it is matter of making a community. -/- Though landscape and participants are particular, integrity and autonomy of the homeland claim the universal status of the land. Adopting Gadamer hermeneutical way of understanding, we reject mutual and equally understanding. Only acceptance of mutual prejudice makes room for asymmetric praxis between locals and foreigners as well as between humans and non-humans. What is more, Gadamer´s hermeneutics makes an ontological status of the foreigner possible and recognizes the interest of homeland’s particularity. This universal status is guaranteed as a priori space-time that links subject’s tradition and that of the land to actual contact with the foreigner. Transpersonal identification is a consequence of converging hermeneutical understanding of foreigner’s particularity and that of the landscape. Ethics of the land evolves from the ethical status of any foreigner in the own homeland. -/- . (shrink)

The paper, based on the H.L.A. Hart Memorial Lecture in Jurisprudence and Moral Philosophy, delivered in Oxford on 11th May 2004, sets out to answer two difficulties which the late J. L. Mackie proposed (in his book Ethics: Inventing Right & Wrong) against the idea of objectivity in ethics. These were (1) the metaphysical peculiarity (‘queerness’) of values and obligations and (2) the ‘well known variation in moral codes from one society to another’ (‘relativity’). It is argued (...) that the true import of Mackie's two difficulties is that they are a challenge to us to study with closer attention the dialectical and conceptual resources of ethical thinking. In the answer to the second difficulty, the ethic of globalism is revealed as a gross misunderstanding of true internationalism.1. (shrink)

This work, originally published in 1952 and now given its first English translation, is based on Brentano’s notes for his lectures given at the University of Vienna from 1876 to 1894. Despite originating from notes, the book is clearly and forcefully written and develops Brentano’s views in an orderly, coherent manner. Although influencing such important philosophers as Edmund Husserl, Alexius Meinong and Nicolai Hartmann, Brentano’s ethical views have been generally ignored by British and American philosophers, a surprising fact in light (...) of the lavish praise they received from G. E. Moore. In reviewing a short collection of Brentano’s essays on ethics, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, Moore said, "This is a far better discussion of the most fundamental principles of Ethics than any others with which I am acquainted.... In almost all points in which he differs from any of the great historical systems, he is right; and he differs with regard to the most fundamental points of Moral Philosophy. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this work.". (shrink)

This is the first English translation of Friedrich Schleiermacher's mature ethical theory. Situated between the better-known positions of Kant and Hegel, Schleiermacher's ethics represents an under-explored and singular option within the rich and creative tradition of German idealism. Schleiermacher is known to English readers primarily as a theologian and hermeneuticist, but many German scholars have argued that it is in fact his philosophical work in ethics that constitutes his most outstanding intellectual achievement. The lectures, which were not published (...) in his lifetime, are thought to span the years 1812-1817 and address such topics as ethics as a descriptive science, ethics as a study of the action of reason on nature, and doctrines of goods, virtue, and duties. This volume presents them in an accessible new translation by Louise Adey Huish, together with an introduction by Robert Louden that sets them in context and assesses their achievement. (shrink)

English summary: The authors of this conference volume describe and discuss various aspects of Popper's ethics, such as for example his contributions to freedom and responsibility, to objectivity and truth, to humanism and to metaphysics, from a critical-rational point of view. This is the first time that Popper's ethics have been brought face to face with the Christian faith. The lectures and the ensuing discussions between Protestant and Catholic theologians and advocates of critical rationalism deal with the (...) question of whether Popper's critiques of religion can be compatible with modern social ethics based on Christianity or whether theology can be a critical-rational science. One of the special attractions of this volume is the fact that it contains not only the revised talks but also the very animated discussions on the various subjects. German description: Karl Popper war nicht nur ein Mensch und Wissenschaftler mit klaren ethischen Grundsatzen, auch seiner Wissenschafts- und Erkenntnistheorie lagen ethische Pramissen zugrunde. Dieser Sachverhalt ist lange nicht erkannt worden, weil Popper selbst nicht daruber gesprochen hat und weil er diese ethischen Voraussetzungen in seinen Werken nicht systematisch dargelegt hat. Wenn es aber zutrifft, dass dem wissenschaftlichen Lebenswerk Poppers ein ethisches Forschungsprogramm zugrunde lag, dann wird es Zeit, sich damit zu befassen.Die Autoren dieses Bandes stellen verschiedene Aspekte von Poppers Ethik, wie z.B. seine Beitrage zur Freiheit und Verantwortung, zur Objektivitat und Wahrheit, zum Humanismus und zur Metaphysik, von einem kritisch-rationalen Standpunkt aus zur Diskussion. Erstmalig wird die Ethik Poppers mit dem christlichen Glauben konfrontiert. In den Beitragen sowie den anschliessenden Diskussionen zwischen evangelischen und katholischen Theologen mit Vertretern des kritischen Rationalismus geht es darum, ob Poppers religionskritische Darlegungen mit einer modernen Sozialethik auf christlicher Basis vereinbar sind, bzw. ob es eine Theologie als kritisch-rationale Wissenschaft geben kann.Ein besonderer Reiz dieses Bandes liegt darin, dass nicht nur die uberarbeiteten Referate, sondern auch die sehr lebhaften Diskussionen zu den verschiedenen Themen enthalten sind. Hier wird noch deutlicher, dass Poppers Philosophie von starken ethischen Voraussetzungen durchdrungen ist. (shrink)

A survey of Kant's philosophical writings reveals an ongoing concern with the problem of moral motivation. The problem is expressed thusly: How can a judgment of the understanding provide a motive sufficient to move the will to an action? ;Kant provides one line of argument in his formal writings on moral theory. The feeling of respect that follows from the recognition of the nobility of the universal moral law provides the motivation or incentive. Through this feeling we are aware that (...) we are beings that belong to an intelligible world that is independent of the mechanism of the sensible world. We are made aware of a higher, supersensible vocation and thus the sublimity of our own nature. ;There is another line of argument, however. A survey of Kant's philosophical writings also reveals a connection between the moral and the aesthetic. In the second Critique duty is called sublime; in his lectures on Ethics from the mid-1760's the feeling that results from free moral action is described as beautiful or sublime. In the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime the sublime is described as a "finer" feeling that moves us as we see the dignity of our own nature displayed in presentations of virtue. In the Critique of Judgment the feeling of the sublime is an experience that makes us aware of our supersensible vocation. Awareness of our supersensible nature through the feeling of pleasure and displeasure provides additional moral motivation and supports the incentive provided by the cognitive faculty's formulation of the moral law. ;A survey of Kant's philosophical writings and especially the unpublished lectures on Ethics, Logic and Metaphysics reveals a continuity in Kant's thought in terms of the relation between the moral and the aesthetic and in terms of concern with the problem of moral motivation. The third Critique was intended as the "keystone of the critical arch," but Kant apparently was not satisfied. The Opus postumum reveals the unity Kant was seeking: the supersensible and the sensible are united in the human person through the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. (shrink)

In his article, Kant ’s Ethics as a part of Metaphysics: a possible Newtonian Suggestion? With Some Comments on Kant ’s “Dream of a Seer”, Giorgio Tonelli suggests a possible relation between Isaac Newton’s conception of attraction and the metaphysical foundation of morals in the light of some considerations on Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik. In this paper, I argue that Immanuel Kant ’s notion of Ethics as a part of metaphysics does not (...) simply derive from Newton and his followers, it is also a philosophical necessity triggered by the development of Kant ’s system and his thought on spontaneity 2. I focus the attention especially on Kant ’s early writings of ethics, in which it is evident the breach with the tradition and the formation of the system. The fist part of the paper sketches the placement of ethics in Kant ’s pre-critical works and its status as science. The second part develops the systematic justification of Kant ’s insertion of ethics within metaphysics. The third part deals with the historical debate on soul-body’s relationship. The fourth and fifth parts account for the history of spontaneity and its reception in Kant ’s early writings. The last two, finally, deal with Kant ’s notion of ethics as part of metaphysics from 1770 to critical period. (shrink)

This 2002 book was the first English translation of Friedrich Schleiermacher's mature ethical theory. Situated between the better-known positions of Kant and Hegel, Schleiermacher's ethics represents an under-explored and singular option within the rich and creative tradition of German idealism. Schleiermacher is known to English readers primarily as a theologian and hermeneuticist, but many German scholars have argued that it is in fact his philosophical work in ethics that constitutes his most outstanding intellectual achievement. The lectures, which were (...) not published in his lifetime, are thought to span the years 1812–17 and address such topics as ethics as a descriptive science, ethics as a study of the action of reason on nature, and doctrines of goods, virtue, and duties. This volume presents them in an accessible new translation by Louise Adey Huish, together with an introduction by Robert Louden that sets them in context and assesses their achievement. (shrink)